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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
FROM FORM TO SUBSTANCE AND BACK AGAIN
ALBERT R. MENARD JR.*
The problems presented by state taxation in the area of interstate
commerce have been numerous and possess remarkable longevity. From
Marshall's discussion in Brown v. Maryland in 1827' to the year 1954,
when the Supreme Court considered the matter at length in several cases',
the probing for lasting solutions to the frequent conflict between the com-
merce clause and the power of the state or one of its political subdivisions
to tax has continued.3 Nor does the absence of written opinion by the
Supreme Court in the last three years indicate that principles have finally,
or even temporarily, crystalized for the guidance of state legislatures, state
departments of revenue andl taxpayers, and that disagreement is at an end.
An inspection of the docket for the current term of the Supreme Court as
of the time when the final draft of this article is in preparation (Decem-
ber, 1956) reveals the filing of no less than seven cases involving this
issue.4 True, certiorari has been denied or the appeal dismissed in nearly
all, and perhaps the remainder will produce no major decision. However,
the current confusion surrounding the commerce clause issue no doubt
was one of the factors that impelled attorneys to carry the cases up, and
Justice Frankfurter has reminded us on a number of occasions that a
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New York and Colorado.
125 U. S. (Wheat.) 419 (1827).
2 Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157 (1954); Railway
Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359 (1954); Braniff Airways v. Nebraska
State Board of Equalization, 347 U. S. 590 (1954); Miller Brothers Co. v. Mary-
land, 347 U. S. 340 (1954), basically a due process case, but so closely related to
commerce clause problems as to be fairly includable.
3As might be expected, the probing has not been limited to Supreme Court
decisions. The author of this article is obviously indebted to many men for his
ideas. In this field recognition should be particularly accorded to the following
extended discussions; GAvIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932), HARTMAN, STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953) and POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, Ch. VI (1956), somewhat of a summary in his
Carpentier Lectures of his extensive writings over a long period of years.
4 Pacific Western Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 136 Cal. App. 2d 794,
286 P. 2d 287 (1955), cert. denied 352 U. S. 805 (1956) ; Leonard v. Bowers, 164-
Ohio St. 578, 132 N.E. 2d 107 (1956), cert. denied 352 U. S. 835 (1956) ;
Williams-McWilliams Industries, Inc. v. McKeigney, 86 So. 2d 672 (Miss. 1956)
appeal dismissed 352 U. S. 807 (1956); Michigan Corporation and Securities
Comm. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 346 Mich. 50, 77 N. W. 2d 249 (1956),
cert. denied 352 U. S. 890 (1956) ; West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of
Opelika, 264 Ala. 700, 87 So. 2d 667, probable jurisdiction noted 352 U. S. 924-
(1956); Alabama v. Plantation Pipe Line, 89 So. 2d 549 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1956),
cert. denied 352 U. S. 943 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Eastman Kodak Co. 385 Pa.
607, 124 A. 2d 100 (1956), cert. denied 352 U. S. 952 (1956).
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failure of the Supreme Court to accept and review a case on the merits
should not be deemed a concurrence in the correctness of the decision
of the state court.' So it is that the topic of this symposium remains ever
timely and there may be some justification in the task assigned this article
by the editors of the symposium to retrace the major aspects of the effort
to evolve a test for the validity of state taxation.
One further generalization is in order, however, before turning to the
task at hand. As in all problems involving constitutional tests, there is not
only the search for principle but also the difficulty of application. The
two actually are but facets of a single problem, try as we may to dis-
tinguish them for purposes of summary. The applicability of state taxation
in the area of interstate commerce provides an outstanding example of
difficulties of this nature. The Supreme Court may say, as it did for a
good many years, that a state may not levy a tax upon interstate com-
merce.' But this sweeping principle merely shifts the issue to an inquiry
into just what constitutes "a prohibited tax on interstate commerce" for
this particular purpose and ultimately, though not inevitably, the trail
has led to an analysis of form rather than substance. 7
A HIsToRY OF EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
As indicated at the outset of this article, the consideration of the
problem originated, as did so many others, with an opinion of John
Marshall. In Brown v. Maryland, the state levied a license tax upon
importers of foreign goods before the privilege of selling these items of
foreign origin could be exercised. The clause of the United States Con-
stitution prohibiting a state from levying an impost or duty on imports'
was no doubt adequate to support a decision that the statute was uncon-
stitutional and Marshall so held.' However, counsel for Brown had urged
that the statute also violated the commerce clause'0 and this contention
was accepted and made a second basis for-the decision". Of course, the
power of the State to tax was acknowledged by Marshall, but, he reasoned,
it must have limitations when applied to interstate commerce.' 2 Taxation
5 See Frankfurter's most recent comments in denying certiorari in Shepard
v. Ohio, 352 U. S. 910 (1956). Earlier cases containing similar comments are col-
lected in STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 151 (2d. ed. 1954).
6 e.. , Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887).
7_At least three of the writers who have treated this topic at length in recent
years have tended ultimately to classify the actions of the Supreme Court by label
rather than principle, albeit complaining about the necessity for so doing. See
GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, Ch. XIII (1932); HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION or
INTERSTATE -COMMERCE (1953); POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARITIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, Ch. VI (1956).
8 U. S. Const. art. 1 §10.
925 U. S. (Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827).
,oId. at 437.
11 Id. at 448.
12 Id. at 449.
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is regulation, regulation is committed to the national government, and the
national power is supreme.
As every student of the Court is aware, a trend away from any
doctrine suggested in Brown v. Maryland that the commerce clause
vests exclusive regulatory power in the national government promptly
set in. However, the commerce clause cases for the next forty years were
not, in general, instances of state tax power opposed to national commerce
power but rather presented problems of the scope of state "police" or
regulatory powers directly applied to commerce. Marshall himself con-
tributed to the acquiescence in state concurrent power over commerce in
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,1 3 and the Court under Chief
Justice Taney firmly set the pattern for recognition of concurrent state
power to regulate in the Cooley case 4 in 1851, a power which could be
exercised except upon items demanding national uniformity.
At this point in the development of commerce clause doctrine it
would seem logical to expect the beginnings of a rather tolerant view
of the scope of state taxation in areas involving interstate commerce,
paralleling the flowering of the concurrent power to regulate theory.
Thus, if a state may regulate directly in many instances, the doctrine
would run, surely it could exercise its sovereign powers of taxation in
these instances and perhaps more.1 But neither Taney himself nor the
court of his era had the opportunity to fully enunciate principle on the
interstate situation.1 6 And when the cases involving state taxation which
touched in some manner upon interstate commerce did begin to flow to
the Supreme Court in some volume in the era of rapid commercial ex-
pansion in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, the climate,
after some vacillation, again became somewhat different. True, the first
few cases show a recognition of the possibility of applying the Cooley
doctrine and it was frequently urged by counsel, but this evolution never
quite became established.
The trend of this period toward a doctrine of the insulation of inter-
state comerce from taxation began with the State Freight Tax Cases17 in
1873, in which a Pennsylvania tax of a fixed amount per ton upon
all freight transported within the state was held invalid as applied to
freight moving in Pennsylvania to out of state destinations. The court
put it thus:' 8
Merchandise is the subject of commerce. Transportation
1327 U. S. (Pet.) 244 (1829).
14 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U. S. (How.) 298 (1851).
15 Cf. Frankfurter's comments, in refusing to accept this rationale. Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 251 (1946).
16But see Taney's dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, 48 U. S.
(How.) 283, 464 (1849) in which the majority struck down a state tax on alier
ship passengers.
1 82 U. S. (Wall.) 232 (1872).
I8 Id. at 281.
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is essential to commerce; and every burden laid upon it is pro
tanto a restriction. Whatever, therefore, may be the true doc-
trine respecting the exclusiveness of the power vested in Con-
gress to regulate commerce among the States, we regard it as
established that no state can impose a tax upon freight trans-
ported from State to State, or upon the transporter because of
such transportation.
Adopting the language of the Court, it would appear that any tax
is some burden, hence a restriction and so forbidden. But the Court was
not prepared to go quite that far at that time.
In the same year, a tax on the gross receipts of a railroad, incorporated
in Pennsylvania and operating solely within the state, but carrying goods
bound for out of state destinations, was held valid.' 9 The result as to
gross receipts was to stand unaltered for only fourteen years20 , but the
reasoning has shown more endurance, though not always acceptance. It
reflected the line taken right down to the present by those seeking to
uphold the power of a state to tax. The Court conceded that every tax
upon property, occupation or franchise affected commerce but stated
that not everything which affected commerce was a regulation thereof,
within the meaning of the Constitution. Hence the Court said, it would
be admitted that the states had power to tax real and personal property
within their boundaries, despite their use for interstate commerce21 and
in subsequent years the Court so held.22
THE EMERGENCE OF DIRECT BURDEN AND SIMILAR TESTs
The two cases just discussed indicated the pattern which would
develop. On the one hand, when the Court talks of burdens, restrictions,
regulations or direct effect upon interstate commerce, it is prepared to erect
19 State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts (Reading R. Co. v. Pennsylvania),
82 U. S. (Wall.) 284 (1872).
2
oPhiladelphia and Southern Steamship v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326
(1887), held invalid a gross receipts tax on a steamship line engaged in inter-
state commerce along the coast, effectively limiting the Railway Gross Receipts
Tax Case, supra n. 17. The result was foreshadowed by Fargo v. Stephens, 121
U. S. 230 (1887), holding invalid a gross receipts tax on a company carrying
freight through Michigan. But see Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217
(1891).
21Supra, n. 19 at 293 (1872).
22 Henderson Bridge Company v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592 (1899), as to
real property; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273 (1878), as to per-
sonal property (river boats) by state of owner; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U. S. 382 (1952), as to present necessity of some apportionment based upon
time or mileage within state, when such tax is levied on vessels. The same rule
applies to railway cars. Union Transit v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905). Con-
versely, states other than that of owner into which vehicles of interstate commerce
go can tax if they will but make a reasonable apportionment. Railway cars, Am.
Ry. Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899); river boats, Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line




a barrier against state taxation.23 A fortiori, it finds invalid taxes which
actually discriminate against interstate commerce.24 But also invalid are
franchise taxes exacted from foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing solely an interstate business, without consideration of their actual
economic effect, but rather because of possible harm.25 License taxes upon
drummers (the nineteenth century forerunner of the sales representative)
meet the same fate.26 Indeed, during this formative period, the Court will
say upon occasion that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all."
On the other hand, if the state will but go about it in the right way,
revenues need not suffer too greatly, although on occasion local business
may suffer some competitive disadvantage. Taxes which can be found to
rest on a local activity, which may be said to affect interstate commerce
only indirectly, or which are believed not to burden it, will receive the
approval of the Court. Thus taxes may rest upon a manufacturer, although
his business involves the making of goods to be shipped in interstate com-
merce.2" So too may the vendor after interstate commerce be reached
if the goods are at hand, be he auctioneer 29 or even itinerant peddler who
comes from out of state bringing his goods with him.3" By the same token,
property itself destined for interstate commerce may be taxed before de-
parture, 31 or while temporarily halted in transit, if the stopover is for the
benefit of the owner.312 Obviously, it may be reached after arrival. 3
Finally, even a franchise tax upon a foreign corporation for the privilege
of engaging in intrastate business may be valid, even though as a matter
of economics the interstate and intrastate business of the corporation are
closely related. 4 Thus the doctrine emerges from a host of cases.
The earlier years of the present century, saw some decrease in the
number of cases coming to the Court involving a state tax and the com-
merce clause, although the stream has never been completely dry since
1873. Many of the taxes of the day had been litigated, and the failure
to discuss them in detail herein is no reflection of the volume of cases
23 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (1891), uses all of these terms in
invalidating a license tax upon a foreign express company doing interstate busi-
ness in Kentucky.
24Welton v..Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
25Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
2 6 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
27Id. at 497.
2 8 American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919). But only
if the state goes about it in the right way. See Adams Manufacturing Co. v.
Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
29 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. (Wall.) 123 (1868).
30Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 (1894).
3 1 Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886).
3 2 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885).
33Id. at 633.
34 Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420 (1903) ; but cf. Allen v. Pullman Co.,
191 U. S. 171 (1903).
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which had actually come before the Court by 1900. True there are always
new problems, and they offer opportunity for refinement. For example,
the Court did have to decide the fate of a net income tax levied upon in-
come derived from interstate commerce, upholding it upon the grounds
that it was merely an indirect burden upon commerce." 5
By and large, the "form" referred to in the title of this article and
by others3 6 had taken shape by 1900, but the shape was not necessarily
symmetrikal. During the following years, Holmes in particular recognized
this, injecting the thought in more than one case that while the problem
is one in which "nice distinctions are to be expected,""7 so also "com-
merce . . . is a practical conception". 8 However, he admitted that the
line of demarcation as to permissible limits of state taxation, while
it was thus practical in his opinion, was not always logical.3 9 He did
deny the fact that it was a matter of label or form.4" On this score
eminent critical authority did not necessarily agree with him for it was
concerning this era that Thomas Reed Powell made his oft quoted
comment that "Names were made to matter more than mathematics or
economics".4" Be that as it may, Holmes in his usual fashion, whether
in dissent or writing for the Court, contributed to a clearer description
of just what was the basis for decision. He also laid some ground work
for later developments when he said, "Even interstate commerce must
pay its way".4
THE MULTIPLE BURDEN TEST-A TEST OF SUBSTANCE
With the increasing percentage of business with interstate aspects after
World War I and even more particularly with the pressure upon state
finances created by the depressions of the thirties, new approaches were
made to taxation by a number of states and so a new spate of major
cases became inevitable. At roughly the same time as business went into
this period of expansion, Justice Stone came to the Court and, after
appearing in dissent on occasion, came to be more successful than Holmes
in persuading the Court to bring a fresh viewpoint to bear upon the
problem. If Holmes, the jurist, was correct in urging that even inter-
state commerce must pay its way, and Thomas Reed Powell, the critic,
35 United States Glue Company v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918).3 6E.9. Barrett, Substance vs. Form in the Applicati6n of the Commerce
Clause to State Taxation, 101 Pa. L. R. 740 (1953).
37 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
225 (1907).
3 8 Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512 (1906).
39 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
227 (1907).
40 Ibid.
41 Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 503
(1947).




was correct in his observations concerning this period that, indeed, the
states can tax interstate commerce if they go about it in the right way,
43
the issue became one of developing a test which would permit more
complete achievement of Holmes' goal and would provide a more adequate
guide to the states in seeking to accomplish that which Powell said they
could. This Stone set about to do, despite the fact that it might have
seemed a hopeless task in the face of precedent.
In the Western Live Stock case,44 he had his first real opportunity.
New Mexico had imposed a gross receipts tax upon advertising revenues
of a magazine. Certain of the advertising was solicited from out of state
sources and the magazines had an interstate circulation. However the
entire business operation and the physical plant was located in New
Mexico. Pursuant to precedent, a strong argument could be made that
the tax was a gross receipts tax on interstate commerce and ipso facto
invalid.4a So also the state might well reply that it was a tax on a "local
activity" or "for a local privilege," and so distinguishable. 41 Stone, writing
for the Court, chose to meet the problem head on rather than follow the
suggested distinction. Recognizing the traditional invalidity of gross
receipts taxes laid upon interstate business, he pointed out that this should
necessarily be so only where there was possibility of a multiple burden by
virtue of several states reaching the same transaction in the same way.
Absent such multiple burden which would place interstate commerce at
a definite economic disadvantage, commerce should bear its share of local
taxation.
Mr. Justice Stone again spoke to the problem of state taxing powers
in a second gross receipts tax case some two years later. In Gwin, White
and Prince v. Heneford47 he found that a Washington tax upon the
gross receipts of a local corporation shipping apples and pears to other
states for sale was not valid. He conceded that certain local taxes upon
gross receipts from interstate commerce were permissable, citing his own
Western Live Stock decision, but pointed out that such cases did not
involve the possibility of a multiple burden, each measured by the entire
amount of the commerce. 4' The factual situation in the case did make
possible such a burden, he felt, for not only might Washington tax the
gross receipts from sales if permitted, but so too might the state of sale
tax the transaction. Taken together with Western Live Stock, the case
makes plain that to Stone, labels do not matter nor are the words "inter-
state commerce" the touchstone which insures freedom from state taxation.
43 Powell, State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 12 Calif. L. Rev.
17 (1923).
44303 U. S. 250 (1938).
45 Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326
(1887).
46 See American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
47 305 U. S. 434.
4 8 1d. at 438.
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The crux of the problem becomes the possible economic effect of the tax,
and commerce should be accorded equal treatment on this basis rather
than on some assumption from the name usually given the tax.
'the actual effect of Stone's multiple or cumulative burdens approach
outside of the area of gross receipts taxation has been questioned.49 Cer-
tainly it does not appear to have been decisive in many cases, other than
those involving gross receipts, even during the years it supposedly pre-
vailed. Even Stone, in deciding in Berwaind-Wite5" that a sales tax
could be collected at the destination end of an interstate shipment, made
relatively little use of his multiple burden approach. True, he makes some
mention of the same line of reasoning that led to the result in TWestern
Live Stock,"' but he appears to make the decision turn upon a "local
activity" basis.5"
Often other justices also gave no more than passing consideration,
if any at all, to the test promulgated in the Western Live Stock case.
Thus Reed, writing for the Court in 1938 in upholding the application
of the California use tax to equipment bought outside the state by a rail-
road and immediately installed upon the railroad when brought into the
state,5" first notes a possible application of the multiple or cumulative
burden test,54 but then seems to turn his decision upon earlier approaches,
stating that the tax rests upon an intrastate activity," and quoting much
from direct-indirect burden cases as well.56 Douglas, in allowing a state
to impose the task of use tax collection upon out of state mail order
houses, if they but have local outlets, states the test to be whether in prac-
tice it imposes a discriminatory burden. 7 Roberts, reiterating the rule that
flat license fees are valid when levied upon peddlers who arrive from out
of state bringing their goods,5" largely contented himself with the local
activity-no burden-test, but also did look to see whether actual dis-
crimination existed.59 In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,6" Stone speak-
49See HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMER E, 40 (1953).
50 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
51 ld. at 46.
52Id. at 58.
53 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1938).
54 Id. at 175.
55 d. at 176.
56 E.g., id. at 179. Cf. Reed's approach in reaffirming the long standing line
of cases concerning "drummers" when he held that a flat license fee upon a sales-
mia by sample was not valid in Best and Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1939).
He stated at p. 455, "In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute
under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work dis-
crimination against interstate commerce."
57 Nelson v. Sears Roebuck, 312 U. S. 359, 366 (1941). Roberts, dissenting
in this case phrased his position, p. 378, in terms the majority of the Court had
been using a few years earlier. To him, despite the arguments of Stone a few
years earlier, the state may not directly burden interstate commerce.
58 Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117 (1941).
59 Id. at 120.
60 322 U. S. 292 (1943).
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ing in dissent, however, did rely heavily upon the possibility of a multiple
burden in urging that Minnesota could not be permitted to levy a personal
property tax upon airplanes with their home port in the state without some
apportionment based upon their ventures elsewhere. 1 Frankfurter, writing
for the court, was more concerned with the nature of Minnesota as a
domiciliary state and the power it should thus possess.62
Other cases could be discussed but enough has been said to indicate
that the actual prevalence of Stone's test, as such, was perhaps not as sig-
nificant a factor as was the apparent willingness of the majority to consider
facts more important than labels. No doubt the progress toward substance
from form was neither as rapid nor as clear cut as the change in views
on economic due process, for example."3 Still, the plea of Holmes for the
"practical" concept *seemed in sight. If there could not be complete
acceptance of Stone's exact phrasing of a test to provide it, perhaps some
variation would produce agreement.
THE RETURN TO FORM
But form dies hard and labels are labels. Three cases decided May
15, 1944,64 prove that order does not come from chaos with any rapidity.
The trend for a time may point to multiple burden as a test but the de-
velopment is never full. Still the proposed test is not quite forgotten, as
will be pointed out.
Thus Arkansas, in one of the 1944 cases just mentioned, cannot
levy a sales tax upon a purchase by an Arkansas resident from a Tennessee
concern, if the sale is technically made in Tennessee, because it is a
sales tax." The Court said that it wasn't a "matter of nomenclature". 66
Three dissenters thought that the majority decision was and that labels
were decisive, for it apparently was generally conceded that Arkansas
could impose a use tax under the circumstances,67 and those who dis-
agreed could see no difference in the economic effect of a sales and a use
tax.6" Justice Stone voted with the majority, and did not set forth his
61d. at 310.
6 2 Id. at 297.
63 See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co.,
335 U. S. 525, 534-536 (1949).
64 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944); General Trading
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944) ; International Harvester Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944).
65 McLeod v. J. E .Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944); Cf. result in Norton v.
Department of Revenue, 340 U. S. 534 (1951) where maintenance of a sales
office as distinguished from the use of a drummer allowed Illinois to exact a gross
receipts tax.
66d. at 331.
67 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U. S. 335
(1944) which was decided the same day as the Dilworth case, supra, n. 65.
68Collection, of course, might be another matter if vendor did not appear
personally. Cf. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954). A fourth justice,
Rutledge, also dissented, but stated his views in his concurring opinion in Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 349 (1944).
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own thinking. Apparently, however, his agreement that Arkansas could
not tax was not attributable to a belief that Tennessee could levy a sales
tax on this interstate transaction. At least his opinion in Gwin, White
and Prince v. Heneford9 (discussed earlier in this article) precluding
state of origin taxation of the gross receipts from the sale of apples,
would so indicate.7" Still, despite this lack of multiple burden, perhaps
there is a sufficient difference in fact, if not in economic effect, between
sale and use to hold Stone with Frankfurter in the decision." Indeed it
has been classified as a due process case involving jurisdiction rather than a
commerce clause case and on such basis the result may be more palatable.72
The other two cases referred to in the preceding paragraphs of
this discussion as having been decided on May 15, 1944, may be noted
more briefly. In one, the Court held that Iowa could imppse a use tax
under circumstances quite comparable to those just described as pre-
venting an Arkansas sales tax. In the other, Indiana, as the vendor's
state, was allowed to apply her gross income tax to a situation in which
an out of state vendee took delivery in Indiana. While the situation thus
differed from the Iowa case, possibly his home state could levy a use tax.
Multiple burden was not shown to be actually present in any of these
three cases, but the hazard was there. Slight differences in fact as well
as major differences in label undeniably existed, but economic reconcili-
ation on any basis of multiple burden is difficult and the name of the tax
again appeared to assume major significance in the area of sales, use and
gross receipts taxes.
Whatever one's. feelings as to the proper way in which the cases
of May 15, 1944, should have been decided and even more particularly
why they should have been so decided, the results made abundantly clear
that rationalization of tax cases was not yet at hand, despite the promise
of a few cases.
Subsequent events have proved that this remains the situation. The
immediate post war decade has added cases but no single guiding principle.
A few examples will suffice.
Thus, in the troubled area of gross receipts, for which Western
Live Stock had promised some order, Freeman v. HewitT3 held that the
Indiana gross income tax could not be levied upon the proceeds of the
69 305 U. S. 436 (1938). See also his comments in the Berwind-White case at
p. 57, that the decision therein did not affect Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,
304 U. S. 307 (1937) invalidating an Indiana gross income statute on the vendor in
interstate sales.
70 Cf. Rutledge's discussion of the point. International Harvester Co. v. Dept.
of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 358 (1944).
71 See Thomas Reed Powell's discussion. Note, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1093 (1944).
72 See Note, State Taxation and Interstate Commerce, 54 Col. L. Rev. 261,
265 (1954). But Cf. Rutledge's own comments on the due process aspects in his
dissent to the case, 322 U. S. 340 at 352-357 (1943).
73 329 U. S. 249 (1946).
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sale of certain securities of an Indiana estate, which had been sold for
the estate by a local broker acting through a New York broker, with
the actual sale taking place upon the New York Stock Exchange. Frank-
furter, writing for the Court, found the tax fatally defective because
it was a direct tax upon an interstate sale." Rutledge concurred because
the tax gave no recognition to the possibility of a multiple burden and
made no effort at apportionment, but objected to the test of direct burden,
applied by the majority, as a return to formalism." Douglas and Murphy,
in dissent, felt that the local activity of the estate could be separated from
the interstate activities of the broker.7 6
In other gross receipts tax situations during the decade the problems
were less striking. The Court allowed Illinois to apply a tax upon persons
selling at retail, measured by gross receipts, to an out of state concern
which maintained a local sales office but shipped goods to local purchasers
from out of state in some instances, 77 a result seemingly justified on the
basis of precedent by Berwind-White, although factually somewhat be-
tween that case and Dilworth in certain of its variations. The Court also
upheld a franchise tax measured by gross receipts levied upon a local
carrier handling goods moving in interstate commerce 78 and the same tax,
when apportioned by mileage, to a carrier actually operating interstate. 79
In the area of license and privilege taxes, the Court has remained
adamantly opposed to several forms of taxation involving interstate com-
merce. In Nippert v. City of RichmondS a plea by the taxing authority
that the local events doctrine of Berwind-White authorized a fixed sum
license fee upon solicitors representing out of state firms was rejected both
on the basis of precedent in previous drummer cases8' and on the possibility
of a discriminatory burden.8 2 There are those who have felt that this
approach, applied without weighing facts, may serve to favor interstate
commerce at the expense of the local merchant rather than protect inter-
state commerce from discrimination.' Again, in Spector Motor Service
v. O'Connor,4 a tax measured by a share of net income apportioned to
the taxing state and thus apparently neither an undue burden nor dis-
74 Id. at 257.
75 Id. at 270, 282.
76 Id. at 285.
77 Norton v. Department of Revenue, 340 U. S. 534 (1951).
78 Canton v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511 (1951).
79 Western Maryland v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520. See also Central Greyhound
Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1947).
80 327 U. S. 416 (1946). See also Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U. S.
389 (19S2).
81 A "long line" beginning with Robbins v. Shelby Cdunty Taxing District
120 U. S. 489 (1887) and including among others, such cases as, Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925).
82 Indeed at one point Rutledge terms the burden possibly cumulative. Nippert
v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 429 (1946).
83Douglas and Murphy, dissenting in Nippert at 436.
84 340 U. S. 602 (1950).
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criminatory was held invalid because it was exacted as a franchise tax
for the privilege of carrying on solely interstate business in Connecticut.
Presumably Connecticut could have taxed for the use of its highways,
measuring the tax as it did, 5 or perhaps it could have even taxed by the
same measure merely because Spector was present in the state and enjoying
its protection." Certainly it could have been taxed in this manner if it
had done a mixed interstate and intrastate business, if the tax was ap-
portioned." But the state could not tax, said the Court, for the privilege
of coming into the state since the state could not deny this privilege.
88
Finally, and along the same lines, the Court held in 1954 that an express
company doing a solely interstate business in Virginia could not be required
to pay a privilege tax measured by gross receipts apportioned to the state.8 9
IN CONCLUSION
Today, as pointed out in the preceding discussion, there is no basic
agreement upon the Court in a number of areas involving collision be-
tween state taxing power and the commerce clause. While recent ap-
pointees remain uncommitted,9" it is unlikely that their presence will bring
any real degree of order into the situation, in view of the opposing posi-
tions taken in a number of cases by those who still remain on the Court.
Recently Professor Barrett of California has suggested that the Court
can ultimately meet the situation by decision, if they will invalidate taxes
which discriminate and hold valid all others.91 He also points to the
possibility of legislative solution,, either by reciprocal state action or by
Congressional action, possibly through an administrative agency.9 2 His
comments on possible judicial solution are somewhat more optimistic than
those of Professor Hartman of Vanderbilt who suggests Congressional
action as probably the only completely effective approach.9 3
While not questioning the availability of either method, a prediction
as to the likelihood of their use may be ventured, based upon the ex-
85 Cf. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U. S. 583 (1953) tax for privilege of using
highway measured by gross weight.
86 Cf. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1947), tax for privilege of
maintaining a pipeline within state, measured by amount of capital employed in
the state; Texas Gas Transmission Co. v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 270 S.W. 2d
384 (1954), cert. denied 348 U. S. 883 (1954).8 7 Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217.
88 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 609 (1950).
89 Railway Express Co. v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359 (19S4).
90 Chief Justice Warren was on the bench during the October 1953 term in
which four commerce clause tax cases were decided, voting with the majority
twice and the dissenters twice but wrote no opinions. Justices Harlan and Brennan
have participated in no major decisions on this issue. At this writing, an
additional appointment is pending.
91 Barrett, Substance v. Form in the Application of the Commerce Clause
to State Taxation, 101 Pa. L. R. 740, 749 (1953).
92 Id. at 789.
93 HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 275-285 (1953).
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perience of the past few years. Stone sought to bring judicial methods
to bear on the problem and this article has traced the somewhat less than
wholly successful result. Congress has seen fit to venture into the field in
recent years only once, 94 despite Black's invitation,95 and that venture,
brought about by unusual circumstances, 96 was hardly prophetic of any
general trend. It would appear that for some years to come, rather close
attention must be paid to the form which a state tax takes and past prec-
edent as to the treatment of such form. If change is in the making, there
is as yet no real evidence of the manner in which it will come or of the
substance of which it will consist.
94 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §1012 (1952). Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408' (1946).
95 Gwin, White and Prince Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 449-455 (1939).
96The desire to preserve state regulation of insurance despite the decision
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
